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SALAZAR V. BUONO: THE PERILS OF PIECEMEAL
ADJUDICATION
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The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Salazar v. Buono,1 a case
involving a Latin cross placed on federal land in the Mojave Desert by the
Veterans of Foreign Wars, approaches what many would assume to be the
central issue in the case from an oblique. Does the Mojave Desert cross,
sitting atop Sunrise Peak in a federal park preserve, violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? Neither Justice Kennedy‘s plurality
opinion nor any of the concurring or dissenting opinions in Salazar answers
that question. Salazar‘s complicated web of facts and procedural history
precluded the Court from resolving the most compelling issue in the Salazar litigation.2 Instead, most of the opinions in Salazar circle the merits of
the constitutionality of the Mojave Desert cross in language ostensibly directed at the remedy—the land transfer statute enacted to preserve the
cross—but arguably aimed at the cross itself. On a charitable view, the plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions simply make the best of the facts
and law given the tortured path of the case through the lower courts. But it
is not folly to speculate that a different path would have presented cleaner
issues for decision and resolution, and would have given some closure to
the litigants involved. Perhaps most important, a decision on the merits of
the constitutionality of the Mojave Desert cross could have clarified the trajectory of the Supreme Court‘s Establishment Clause doctrine for future
cases.3
This Essay briefly reviews the facts and procedural history of Salazar,
and offers some thoughts on why the litigation may have proceeded as it
did, leading to piecemeal adjudication of an important constitutional issue.
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1
130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (link).
2
See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1814.
3
See Christopher Lund, Salazar v. Buono and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 105 NW. U.
L. REV. COLLOQUY 60 (2010) (acknowledging the lack of clarity in the Court‘s Establishment Clause
doctrine,
particularly
in
cases
involving
symbols),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/22/LRColl2010n22Lund.pdf (link).
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Finally, the Essay concludes with a discussion of what Salazar may mean
for the future of the Supreme Court‘s Establishment Clause doctrine.
I.

THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE SALAZAR
LITIGATION
In 1934, the Veterans of Foreign Wars donated the Mojave Desert
cross to the Mojave National Preserve and perched it atop Sunrise Rock,
where it sat for nearly seventy years without legal challenge. The cross has
existed in several forms over the years, but its most recent iteration consists
of four-inch diameter white metal pipes; the cross itself stands somewhere
under eight feet tall.4 Citizens have used the area around Sunrise Rock as a
campsite and have held Easter services at the site of the cross.5 In 1999,
however, the park service received a request to install a ―stupa,‖ or Buddhist shrine, near the cross.6 The National Park Service denied the request
but announced that it would remove the cross.7 In response to the Park Service announcement, Congress passed legislation to prevent federal money
from being used to remove the cross.8 Meanwhile, Frank Buono, a retired
National Park Service employee and former assistant superintendent of the
Preserve, with the help of the local ACLU, sued to have the cross removed
on the ground that it violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.9 As a retired park service employee who
regularly visits the preserve, Buono reportedly drove out of his way to
avoid the cross on his visits, not because of religious offense (he is Catholic), but because he is offended by the presence of a religious symbol on
public property where other symbols are not also allowed to be displayed.
Buono obtained an injunction to have the cross removed,10 and the Park
Service covered up the cross, first with a tarp and then with a plywood box
during the pendency of the litigation.11 Before Buono obtained the injunction from the district court,12 however, Congress passed legislation designating the Mojave Desert cross a national memorial ―commemorating United
States participation in World War I and honoring the American veterans of
that war.‖13
4

Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1812.
Id.
6
Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1205–06 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (link).
7
Id. at 1206.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 1202.
10
Id. at 1217.
11
Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1812–13.
12
Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
13
Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recover from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137, 115 Stat. 2230,
2278–79 (2002) (link).
5
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The government appealed the injunction to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, arguing that the Mojave Desert cross did not violate the Establishment Clause and that Buono lacked standing to challenge the monument.14 While the parties awaited a decision, Congress passed legislation
barring the use of government funds to dismantle World War I memorials.15
Congress subsequently entered into the land exchange at issue in Salazar.
Under the proposed land transfer, the government would give to the local
VFW the cross and one acre of land on which the cross sits in exchange for
five acres of land in the same preserve—a parcel owned by veteran Henry
Sandoz and his wife.16 The statute contained a reverter in favor of the government if the VFW failed to maintain the property as a ―war memorial,‖17
but, given that the Sandozes had maintained the cross display since 1998, it
was safe to assume that they would continue to maintain not just any memorial, but the cross that historically had been displayed at the site.18
When the Ninth Circuit rendered its decision on the injunction appeal,
the government lost on both the merits and the standing issues.19 Rather
than appeal the Ninth Circuit‘s decision on the injunction to the U.S. Supreme Court, however, the government allowed the time for appeal to lapse.
Meanwhile, Buono challenged the land transfer in the district court on the
ground that the transfer violated the injunction. Specifically, Buono characterized the land transfer as an unconstitutional ruse to keep the cross in
place, rather than a legitimate attempt to comply with the original injunction.20 The government lost,21 appealed, and lost for the second time in the
Ninth Circuit.22 This time, however, the government sought review from
the U.S. Supreme Court on the issues of whether the land transfer violated
the injunction and whether Buono had standing to challenge it in the first
instance, but not whether either the Mojave Desert cross or the land transfer
violated the Establishment Clause.23 Thus, the somewhat complicated facts
14

Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2004) (link).
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-248, § 8065(b), 116 Stat.
1519, 1551 (2002) (link). Previously, Congress had passed legislation that barred the use of government
funds to dismantle the Mojave Desert cross. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106554, § 133, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-230 (2001) (link).
16
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87, § 8121, 117 Stat. 1054,
1100 (2003); Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1813.
17
Id.
18
Henry and Wanda Sandoz had maintained the cross since 1983. In 1998 Mr. Sandoz constructed
the most recent version of the monument. Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1812. According to Sandoz, he made a
promise to a dying veteran to preserve the monument. Mojave Cross, Religion & Ethics News Weekly
(Oct.2, 2009), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/episodes/october-2-2009/mojave-cross/4424/
(link).
19
Buono, 371 F.3d at 548, 550.
20
Buono, 364 F. Supp. at 1178.
21
Id. at 1182.
22
Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2007).
23
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at (I), Salazar, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (No. 08-472).
15
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and procedural history before the Supreme Court left it with few options
other than to dispose of the case on standing grounds (an unlikely result), to
reconcile the land transfer statute with the final injunction, or to find that
the land transfer violated that injunction.
II. THE SALAZAR OPINIONS24
Justice Kennedy‘s plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and joined in part by Justice Alito, grudgingly acknowledges the District
Court‘s decision, affirmed on appeal, that the Mojave Desert cross violates
the Establishment Clause.25 On the issue of whether the land transfer can be
squared with the injunction, however, the plurality remanded the case so
that the district court could consider the ―change of law‖ created by congressional action.26 According to the plurality, the land transfer resulted
from a ―congressional statement of policy applicable to the case‖ that the
district court failed to consider: the policy of accommodation.27 According
to the plurality, ―[t]he Constitution does not oblige government to avoid any
public acknowledgment of religion‘s role in society. Rather, it leaves room
to accommodate divergent values within a constitutionally permissible
framework.‖28
Given the plurality‘s broad statements about the virtues of accommodation and the district court‘s supposed error in that regard, it seems curious
that the plurality did not simply decide the issue in favor of the government.
The additional reason given for the remand is not particularly persuasive.
Justice Kennedy stated that the district court‘s original injunction was based
on the perception of endorsement under the ―effect‖ prong of Lemon v.
Kurtzman,29 while the court later enjoined the land transfer based on congressional intent, i.e., the ―intent‖ prong of Lemon.30 Putting aside the questions of whether this analysis metastasizes Lemon into several doctrines
instead of one and whether the analysis is an unduly stringent construction

24
Excluded here is any discussion of the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Roberts and the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer. Neither Justice seems to believe that Salazar presents any live Establishment Clause issues. See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1821(Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 1842 (Breyer,
J., dissenting). Likewise, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concludes that Buono lacked standing. See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1824 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia‘s concurrence appears to follow a recent trend of disposing of controversial church and state disputes on standing
grounds. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc, 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (link); Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (link).
25
See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1815.
26
Id. at 1818.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 1818–19 (citations omitted).
29
403 U.S. 602 (1971) (link).
30
See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1819.
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of the injunction,31 the question itself points to a very simple fix. The district court need only rephrase its earlier conclusion to declare that a reasonable observer would perceive the land transfer as an attempt by Congress to
endorse religion. Why the plurality demands that the district court spell out
this conclusion on remand is a puzzle, unless the plurality expects the district court to reach a different one.32
Justice Kennedy‘s plurality opinion rests on very narrow ground; nonetheless, it states some broad propositions about the Establishment Clause.
While distancing itself from the lower court decision, the plurality notes
that ―[t]he goal of avoiding governmental endorsement does not require
eradication of all religious symbols in the public realm.‖33 The opinion
leaves little doubt about how the plurality would have decided the case on
the merits of the constitutionality of the Mojave Desert cross; likewise,
there is little doubt about the direction the plurality expects the district court
to take on remand.
Justice Alito would avoid this extra step; his concurrence reaches out
to hold that the land transfer does not violate the injunction at all.34 Justice
Alito‘s opinion recasts the characterization of the Mojave Desert cross in
unmistakable terms:
[T]he original reason for the placement of the cross was to
commemorate American war dead and, particularly for
those with searing memories of The Great War, the symbol
that was selected, a plain unadorned white cross, no doubt
evoked the unforgettable image of the white crosses, row
on row, that marked the final resting places of so many
American soldiers who fell in that conflict.35
For the dissenters, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, provided a forceful defense of the district court‘s finding of endorsement.36 Justice Stevens recognized the obvious: that Congress
intended the land transfer to preserve the cross.37 Moreover, because Congress designated the cross a national memorial, the lower court‘s finding of
endorsement of religion should apply to the Mojave Desert cross whether it
31

Ironically, in the lower court proceedings following Lemon, the Court was more generous when it
considered whether a subsequent injunction fulfilled the Court‘s mandate in that case. See Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973) (link).
32
See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1820–21 (suggesting that the district court on remand should analyze
the land transfer in the context of ―all relevant factors‖ including the congressional policy of accommodation).
33
Id. at 1818.
34
Id. at 1821 (Alito, J., concurring).
35
Id. at 1822.
36
Id. at 1832–33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37
Id.
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sits on public or private land.38 Speaking directly to the plurality, Stevens
rejected the proposition that a congressional motive of accommodation
could overcome a finding of endorsement of religion.39 Justice Stevens highlighted the significance of the cross as a sectarian symbol throughout the
dissent, and he countered the plurality‘s and Alito‘s contrary characterizations as an attempt to re-decide the underlying issue of whether the Mojave
Desert cross violates the Establishment Clause.40
III. THE PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE
The reason that the opinions in Salazar fail to squarely address the issue of whether the Mojave Desert cross violates the Establishment Clause is
simple: the district court‘s injunction and the finding upon which it was
based, affirmed in the Ninth Circuit, became final and binding res judicata
when the government failed to timely appeal that earlier decision to the
U.S. Supreme Court.41 (As if to deflate any contrary expectations, Justice
Breyer noted at oral argument that the only remaining legal dispute in the
case was the ―very technical boring issue‖ of whether in enacting the land
transfer statute the government would be in compliance with the injunction.42) It follows, then, that the proximate reason that the issue was foreclosed amounted to the government‘s decision not to appeal the Ninth
Circuit‘s original adverse ruling.43 That decision may have left some scratching their heads. If the government wanted to win, why not press its case
all the way to the Supreme Court?
Had the Supreme Court been tasked with discerning the constitutionality of the Mojave Desert cross itself, the government would have had at its
disposal some strong arguments based on a pair of 2005 Supreme Court
Ten Commandments decisions—Van Orden v. Perry44 and McCreary
County v. ACLU.45 The Mojave Desert cross had a 68-year historical pedi38

Id.
Id. at 1838–40.
40
Id. at 1839.
41
Id. at 1815 (―The District Court granted the 2002 injunction after concluding that a cross on federal land violated the Establishment Clause. The Government unsuccessfully challenged that conclusion
on appeal, and the judgment became final upon direct review. . . . The Government therefore does not—
and could not—ask this Court to reconsider the propriety of the 2002 injunction or the District Court‘s
reasons for granting it.‖).
42
Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Salazar, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (No. 08-472) (link).
43
I assume for the purpose of this essay that the Department of Interior would have wanted to obtain a judgment from the Supreme Court that overturned the Ninth Circuit ruling but either made a strategic decision not to petition for a grant of certiorari to obtain such a judgment or simply missed the
deadline for filing an appeal.
44
545 U.S. 677 (2005) (upholding the constitutionality of a 40-year old Ten Commandments display donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles) (link).
45
545 U.S. 844 (2005) (striking down a relatively recent government display including the Ten
Commandments) (link).
39
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gree, reminiscent of the 40-year Texas Ten Commandments display upheld
in Van Orden. Unlike the Ten Commandments display struck down in
McCreary, the Mojave Desert cross was donated by the Veterans of Foreign
Wars, rather than having been commissioned by the government. Likewise,
the Mojave Desert cross had a long usage as a commemoration of the war
dead, in addition to its religious use as a site for Easter services.46 In his
contribution to this symposium, Professor Lund stresses the profound religious significance of the cross to Christian believers, a fact which distinguishes it from the Ten Commandments—and no doubt he is right.47 Yet
the history of the cross as a symbol of the slain, regardless of whether that
meaning also has a religious connotation and regardless of its effect on
those who do not embrace that connotation, resonates more closely with the
prevailing view in Van Orden.48 Nevertheless, neither Van Orden nor
McCreary had been decided at the time of the Ninth Circuit‘s decision
upholding the district court‘s finding of unconstitutionality. In fact, the
Ninth Circuit issued a decision on the merits in June of 2004,49 and the
deadline to appeal passed two months later. The Supreme Court did not
grant certiorari in Van Orden and McCreary, however, until October of that
year.50 Therefore, the government in its second appeal to the Ninth Circuit
was left with the argument that the decisions in Van Orden and McCreary
made the original injunction moot, a position the Ninth Circuit apparently
rejected.51
Without Van Orden and McCreary to provide a template for Supreme
Court litigation involving religious symbols, the government likely analyzed the potential fate of the Mojave Desert cross under the Court‘s prior
pair of symbols cases—Lynch v. Donnelly52 and County of Allegheny v.
ACLU.53 A critical factor in evaluating the application of those cases was
probably an attempt to predict the vote of Justice Sandra Day O‘Connor,
whose endorsement test was introduced in her concurrence in Lynch and

46

Ninth Circuit Judge Diarmuid O‘Scannlain made precisely these arguments in his dissent to the
denial of rehearing en banc. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 764–65 (9th Cir. 2008) (denial of
rehearing en banc) (O‘Scannlain, J., dissenting) (link).
47
See Lund, supra note 3, at 64–65.
48
See infra p. 83; Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Salazar, 130 S. Ct.
at 1817 (citing Justice Breyer‘s concurrence in Van Orden); Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691–92 (―The inclusion of the Ten Commandments monument in this group has a dual significance, partaking of both
religion and government.‖).
49
See Buono v. Kempthorne, 371 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2004).
50
See Van Orden v. Perry, 543 U.S. 923 (2004); McCreary County v. ACLU, 543 U.S. 924 (2004).
51
See Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d at 764 (O‘Scannlain, J., dissenting) (noting that the court
failed to mention the argument).
52
465 U.S. 668 (1984).
53
492 U.S. 573 (1989). Stone v. Graham, an earlier case applying the Lemon test, involved a Kentucky statute that required the posting of the Ten Commandments in every public school classroom. 449
U.S. 39 (1980).
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adopted by the Supreme Court in County of Allegheny.54 Although the
Court in Lynch upheld the crèche in that case—a manger scene surrounded
by a hodgepodge of Christmas holiday fare55—a plurality of the Court in
County of Allegheny applied O‘Connor‘s endorsement test to strike down a
stand-alone crèche in a county courthouse.56 The endorsement test, the
framework the district court used to invalidate the Mojave Desert cross,57
has been applied in numerous lower court cases to invalidate other religious
displays.58 Whether the Supreme Court would have applied the endorsement test and how Justice O‘Connor would have voted were two big questions that the government likely could not answer with any degree of
certainty.59
Viewed in light of this ambiguity, the government‘s decision (assuming it was a decision) to let the time for appeal of the injunction lapse and
defer to Congress to solve the problem made sense. Congress postponed
the need to ponder doctrinal uncertainties when it enacted the land transfer.60 Congressional action represented an easy solution by a group of actors who were politically motivated to preserve the veterans‘ memorial
cross. Ultimately, however, congressional action must pass constitutional
muster, and the final arbiter of that question is the United States Supreme
Court. So one way or another, one would expect that the issue of the constitutionality of the Mojave Desert cross would likely end up before the Supreme Court—if not on its own, then tangled up in the legislation designed
to keep the cross in place.
Unfortunately, Salazar presented the issue of the constitutionality of
the Mojave Desert cross twice removed. However, the opinions in the case
54

Justice O‘Connor‘s articulation of the endorsement test focuses on whether government symbols
send ―a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community,
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community.‖ Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O‘ Connor, J., concurring). O‘Connor added that ―[d]isapproval
sends the opposite message.‖ Id.
55
Id. at 687.
56
Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (link). In Allegheny, a plurality of the Court
distinguished Lynch on the ground that the crèche in that case had been surrounded by other items that
detracted from its religious message, while the crèche in the county courthouse stood alone. Id. at 598.
57
Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp.2d 1202, 1216-17 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
58
See, e.g., Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1987) (link); ACLU v.
City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d 1561 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939 (1986) (link).
59
Although Justice O‘Connor‘s endorsement test focuses on whether nonadherents are made to feel
like outsiders, this expansive understanding of the Establishment Clause conflicts with O‘Connor‘s approval of civil references to religion such as the Pledge and ―In God We Trust‖ on the currency, sometimes described as ―ceremonial deism.‖ On more than one occasion O‘Connor defended the doctrine of
ceremonial deism, notably in her concurrence in the Pledge of Allegiance case, in which she argued that
one factor weighing in favor of the Pledge was its ―history and ubiquity.‖ Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist.
v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 37–38 (2004) (O‘Connor, J., concurring).
60
Cf, e.g., Mercier v. Fraternal Order of the Eagles, 395 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2005) (link); Freedom
From Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F. 3d 487 (7th Cir. 2000).
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occasionally pierce through to the merits, and also provide some insight into the Justices‘ views regarding the Court‘s Establishment Clause doctrine.
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE SUPREME COURT‘S JURISPRUDENCE OF
MONUMENTS AND SYMBOLS
Although the Salazar decision does not directly address the constitutionality of the Mojave Desert cross, the case does provide some potential
insight into the current Court‘s approach to religious monuments and symbols. It can be argued that a slim majority of the Court now favors the principle of accommodation. Justice Kennedy‘s plurality decision makes the
case for accommodation in broad terms, and Justice Alito‘s concurrence
strikes a similar chord.61 Justices Scalia and Thomas would have denied the
plaintiff standing to challenge the land transfer, but both Justices have been
stalwart supporters of the principle of accommodation in the past.62 Even
Justice Breyer has stated previously that cultural strife may be avoided
when the Court‘s Establishment Clause jurisprudence does not demand removal of every longstanding religious symbol from the public square.63
The fact that a majority of the Court appears to support the principle of
accommodation of religion raises certain implications for the endorsement
test. Some of the commentary on the meaning of the Salazar opinions involves speculation about whether the Supreme Court continues to be committed to Justice O‘Connor‘s endorsement test as a measure of the
Establishment Clause.64 In an earlier article on the Court‘s government
speech decision in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, I argued that Justice
Alito‘s majority opinion signaled a possible retreat from the endorsement
test.65 Justice Alito, writing for all of the Justices except Justice Souter,
61
The Chief Justice‘s somewhat cryptic concurrence reveals no motive to effect a doctrinal sea
change, but the fact that he joined in Justice Kennedy‘s plurality opinion is sufficient to show agreement
with the dicta in support of accommodation.
62
See. e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1139–40 (2009)(Scalia, J., concurring) (link); McCreary, 545 U.S. 844, 905 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
631 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (link).
63
Van Orden, 545 U.S. 677, 703 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
64
See Ian Bartrum, Salazar v. Buono: Sacred Symbolism and the Secular State, 105 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY
31
(2010),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/20/LRColl2010n20Bartrum.pdf
(link);
Mary Jean Dolan, Salazar v. Buono: The Cross Between Endorsement and History, 105 Nw. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 42 (2010), http://colloquy.law.northwestern.edu/main/2010/09/salazar-v-buono-the-crossbetween-endorsement-and-history.html (link); see also David G. Savage, Supreme Court Allows Mojave
War Memorial Cross, L.A. TIMES.COM, Apr. 29, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/29/nation/lana-court-cross-20100429 (noting that Justice O‘Connor had employed the endorsement test, and that the
decision in Salazar suggests that the Supreme Court has ―shifted somewhat to the right‖) (link).
65
See Lisa Shaw Roy, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum: Monuments, Messages, and the Next Establishment
Clause,
104
NW.
U.
L.
REV.
COLLOQUY
280
(2010)
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/5/LRColl2010n5Roy.pdf (link). But see
Dolan, supra note 64, at 52 (summarizing Mary Jean Dolan, Government Identity Speech and Religion:
Establishment Clause Limits After Summum, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J., (forthcoming 2010)).
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seemed to suggest in Summum that the Court no longer views monuments
and symbols through an exclusively outsider lens. Alito stated that a monument ―may be intended to be interpreted, and may in fact be interpreted
by different observers in a variety of ways.‖66 Particularly in the context of
symbols and displays, without a reasonable observer who can discern a
message of exclusion the endorsement test loses much of its content.
Now, in Salazar, a case that began as litigation under the Establishment Clause, Justice Alito‘s concurrence and Kennedy‘s plurality opinion
appear to confirm the move from no-endorsement toward its opposite pole,
accommodation.67 The accommodation to which the Court referred shifts
the focus away from whether a hypothetical observer may perceive an exclusionary message. Instead, as its definition suggests, accommodation requires that the parties attempt ―a reconciliation of differences,‖68 and it
invites potential litigants to make peace with some traces of religion in public life. Commentators have recognized that an unyielding Establishment
Clause jurisprudence leaves the losing side no less alienated than the group
prevailing in a lawsuit.69 One can only imagine the stakes being higher in
the case of the proposed removal of a veteran‘s memorial, a lone cross in a
remote desert outpost. Picking up on this intuition, Justice Alito repeatedly
warned that the alternative to accommodation would lead to the ―disturbing
symbolism‖ of the dismantling of the Mojave Desert cross and other symbols and monuments like it.70
Nonetheless, the shift to accommodation in Salazar is made piecemeal,
and for that reason, there is room for disagreement about the direction of the
Court‘s symbols and monuments cases. For example, in contrast to my explanation, Professor Mary Jean Dolan argues in her symposium piece that
Justice Alito‘s opinion in Summum and his concurrence in Salazar, along
with the reasoning of the Salazar plurality, all depend on a contextual un66

Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134–35 (2009). I do not read Justice Alito‘s
language in Summum as an assertion that monuments have no meaning. Contra Dolan, supra note 64, at
52. Rather, Justice Alito‘s Summum opinion introduces the idea that there are multiple, real observers to
any monument, and that a monument‘s perceived meaning depends on these actual perspectives. This is
consistent with the idea that in the case of certain monuments, such as the Statue of Liberty, there can be
a widely-shared consensus on a prominent meaning conveyed by the monument. See id. at 52–53 (citing Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1135).
67
In Salazar, for example, Justice Alito asserts that observers of the Mojave Desert cross ―appear to
have viewed it as conveying at least two significantly different messages.‖ Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1822
(Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing Summum 129 S. Ct. at 1135).
68
Accomodation Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/accommodation (last visited Sept. 18, 2010) (link).
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derstanding of monuments that is the hallmark of the endorsement test.71
Professor Dolan therefore suggests that in Salazar, the endorsement test‘s
basic inquiry survives alongside accommodation as two points on a continuum rather than as opposite poles.72 While plausible, this interpretation
fails to adequately account for the fact that Justice O‘Connor‘s endorsement
test focuses on the message conveyed to a religious outsider,73 but the Salazar plurality and Justice Alito‘s concurrence do not.74 Under the endorsement test, a key question is whether a reasonable observer who views the
Mojave Desert cross would perceive a message of religious exclusion.75
On the other hand, Justice Alito‘s concurrence in Salazar notes that
multiple observers have understood the Mojave desert cross to convey ―at
least two significantly different messages‖—one religious, and one historical.76 Moreover, the fact that Justice Alito‘s Salazar concurrence expands
the discussion to include observers who would be offended by the symbolism of having the cross removed runs counter to the logic of the endorsement test.77 In fact, nowhere in Salazar does Justice Alito connect the
―disturbing symbolism‖ of the destruction of the monument with the perceptions of the endorsement test‘s ―reasonable observer.‖78 Rather, to the
extent that Justice Kennedy‘s plurality opinion in Salazar discusses the

71
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Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O‘Connor, J., concurring); see supra note 54. Justice O‘Connor‘s endorsement test arguably served her vision of a society that would, as she described, ―place ourselves in
another‘s shoes, to see things that may not be as fair or as equitable as they appear from our own vantage points.‖ SANDRA DAY O‘CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE 276 (2003).
74
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Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O‘Connor, J., concurring); Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 547-50 (9th
Cir. 2004) (discussing plaintiffs‘ standing and the merits); Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1832 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating the test as prohibiting government from ―appearing to take a position on questions of
religious belief or from ‗making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person‘s standing in the
political community‘‖ (quoting Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573, 593–94 (1989) and O‘Connor‘s concurrence in Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687)).
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proper application of the endorsement test, it seems, as the plurality notes
from the outset, that it is simply constrained by res judicata.79
The potential ascendancy of accommodation, however, presents challenges for its advocates. Professor Stanley Fish maintains that to ―dereligionize‖ a monument to argue in support of its constitutionality is disingenuous; of course everyone knows that the cross is a religious symbol.80
This assertion, while true, oversimplifies Justice Kennedy‘s argument in an
important respect. The Mojave Desert cross is religious and secular at the
same time; Kennedy‘s argument rests on a ―both and‖, rather than an ―either or‖ proposition.81 In many cases, the religious aspect of the symbol is
an irreducible and historically-identified component. A virtue of accommodation is that it does not demand a choice between two undesirable extremes—on the one hand, an obsessive focus on religion to the exclusion of
important historical and cultural realities; and on the other, an implausible
denial of a symbol‘s religious character.
Perhaps a more serious challenge for religionists is the assertion that
they can only obtain something of a Pyrrhic victory when the constitutionality of a religious symbol like the cross rests on the conclusion that the cross
is also secular. As Professor Bartrum explains in his contribution to this
symposium, a legal doctrine that emphasizes the secular aspects of a religious symbol arguably empowers the state to exercise a ―corruptive power‖
over religion.82 He reminds us of the revival of scholarship on the legacy of
Roger Williams, founder of Rhode Island and the intellectual forebear of
modern-day evangelicals, who adamantly opposed state intrusion into the
garden of religious life.83 Nonetheless, it is far from clear that eighteenth
century evangelicals would have opposed public religious symbols and monuments on separationist grounds.84 Further, as to these evangelicals‘ mod79
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ern-day counterparts, the litigation of these issues reveals that religionists
themselves appear to perceive little internal threat from Supreme Court
statements about the secular character or appeal of religious symbols.85
But all of this is not to suggest that we know precisely what accommodation means or what its limits are.86 In the context of symbols and monuments accommodation may still be ―a label, not a theory.‖87
If
accommodation is, in fact, the Court‘s new direction, then it will be important to understand its scope, and Salazar, unfortunately, does not aid in that
process.88
CONCLUSION
The long-awaited decision in Salazar v. Buono offers a partial view into the future of the Court‘s Establishment Clause doctrine. The decision
would have offered a nearly perfect window if the constitutionality of the
Mojave Desert cross had been the central issue in the case. Instead, the piecemeal litigation in Salazar leaves us with many unanswered questions, and
perhaps more litigation ahead. Salazar returns the dispute to the district
court for a re-evaluation of the propriety of the land transfer. We are told
that, on remand, the district court is to consider the policy of accommodation.89 Perhaps we are also told that, in the coming years, a majority of the
Supreme Court will be guided by it as well.
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